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KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY

Evidence
By ROBERT G. LAWSON*
I.

IMPEACHMENT OF AN ACCUSED BY FELONY CONVICTIONS

In Martin v. Commonwealth' the defendant, who stood
charged with murder and with being a habitual criminal,
elected to testify in his own defense. During his crossexamination the prosecution was permitted to prove the commission of five prior felony offenses-three for breaking and
entering, one for forgery and one for operating a motor vehicle
without the owner's consent. This evidence was offered and
received exclusively for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's testimony. Following a conviction for murder, the defendant appealed, presenting the use of his prior criminal record
as his principal claim for appellate relief. The Court of Appeals, finding no error in the trial court's action, affirmed the
conviction.
The most significant aspect of this decision was the apparent ease with which the issue was resolved. In recent years the
Kentucky Court of Appeals has viewed the admissibility of an
accused's prior convictions as an evidence problem of special
difficulty, involving considerable risk of distortion to the
decision-making process. A very cautious attitude toward the
use of such evidence has guided the Court in recent decisions.
But the Martin case is clearly different. It does not reflect an
attitude of caution on this issue and, therefore, suggests a need
for review of developments in this important area of impeachment doctrine. Such a review must necessarily center around
the case of Cotton v. Commonwealth.'
A.

The "Cotton" Doctrine

Before 1970 it was possible to impeach the testimony of a
criminal defendant by proof of a prior conviction for any felony
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1960, Berea College; J.D. 1963,
University of Kentucky.
507 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1974).
2 454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1970).
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offense. The nature of the criminal act underlying that conviction was of no significance to the issue of admissibility. A prior
conviction for murder was as admissible for this purpose as a
prior conviction for perjury. However, the method by which
such evidence had to be introduced served in large measure to
conceal the identity of the prior offense. Impeachment of this
type had to start with a question to the defendant about the
existence of prior felony convictions. An affirmative response
to this inquiry (i.e., an admission by the defendant of a prior
conviction) completed the impeachment process. Introduction
of extrinsic proof of the conviction was foreclosed by the admission, and the jury was left without knowledge of the specific
offense previously committed by the accused. Only a denial of
the existence of prior convictions would authorize the prosecution to go behind the defendant's testimony, and even then
merely to the extent of proving a single prior felony conviction.'
In 1970 the Court of Appeals decided Cotton v. Commonwealth, which made substantial modifications in this law,
and, in doing so, adopted an approach to the impeachment
of an accused that is as enlightened as any that exists in this
country.
The first important change made by the Cotton decision
resulted from a reconsideration of the threshold requirement of
"relevancy," as applied to testimonial credibility. The "old"
rule, which authorized the use of any felony conviction, was
based on a belief that evidence of the commission of a serious
crime establishes a "general readiness to do evil" from which
it is possible to infer "a readinessto lie in the particular case."'
Concern over the validity of this belief surfaced in Cotton and
ultimately led to the conclusion that the relevancy of a criminal act, when offered for credibility purposes, should be dependent on the logical relationship of the act to the actor's disposition for truthfulness. The consequence of the Cotton decision
is a much more restricted rule of admissibility than prevailed
under previous doctrine. A felony conviction is now admissible
only if the conduct from which it resulted involved an element
of "falsehood" or "dishonesty." The change in "credibility"
3 Cowan v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1966).

1 Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
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law that was accomplished by this part of the case is
sufficiently significant to assure Cotton ultimate recognition as
an exceptional opinion. Yet, the second major change that resulted from the decision is probably even more important.
For many years the Kentucky law of evidence, in its treatment of an accused as a witness, was influenced by a single
thought-that once a criminal defendant relinquishes his right
of refusal to testify he is like all other witnesses for all purposes.
The intellectual defect in this notion should be obvious. The
defendant in a criminal case is the total purpose of the proceedings. He is the nucleus around which everything in the case
revolves. In no way is it possible for him to be like an "ordinary" witness. The Court of Appeals recognized this reality in
Cotton and rejected the long-standing practice of automatic
admission of "relevant" convictions against an accused. Substituted in its place was an approach that requires a trial court
judge to exercise "sound judicial discretion" in ruling on the
admissibility of such evidence:
The exercise of discretion by the trial judge in this area
should primarily consist of weighing . . . [the need of the
jury] for relevant evidence of the witness' untrustworthiness
...against the possible prejudice to the witness . . . in
being convicted not of the crime for which he is charged but
of some crime for which he has been convicted and punished
on some prior occasion.
The attitude toward impeachment of an accused reflected in
this quotation is identical to that adopted by a federal court of
appeals in Luck v. United States.' The importance of this part
of the "Cotton doctrine" is fully revealed by the recognition
accorded the Luck opinion. It has been described by evidence
writers as a "revolutionary" step,7 a "landmark decision," ' and
as "the most practical method for balancing the interests of
both prosecutor and defense." 9 With no features to distinguish
Cotton v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Ky. 1970).
348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
7 Peltz, More Than a Matterof Luck, 19 N.Y.L. FORuM 833, 837 (1974).
a Glick, Impeachment by PriorConvictions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for U.S. District Courts, 6 CmM. L. BuLL. 330, 339 (1970).
' Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by his PriorConvictions and the Proposed
FederalRules of Evidence:A Half Step Forwardand Three Steps Backward, 1 LoyoLA
U.L.J. 247, 253 (1970).
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it from Luck, the Cotton decision is deserving of the same
credit.
B.

Subsequent Developments

In the years that have elasped since this important decision, the Court of Appeals has been confronted on several occasions with the general problem of impeachment of a defendant
by use of previous convictions. Both parts of the case have been
the subject of additional consideration. Subsequent cases dealing with the first aspect of Cotton have served merely to elucidate the guideline formulated in the 1970 case, which itself was
fairly specific in describing the types of conduct that would be
considered relevant to credibility:
By crimes involving dishonesty, stealing, and false swearing,
we mean such felonies as perjury, subornation of perjury,
obtaining money or property under false pretenses, forgery,
embezzlement, counterfeiting, fraudulent alterations, misappropriation of funds, false personation, passing checks without sufficient funds or on non-existent banks, fraudulent destruction of papers or wills, fraudulent concealment, making
false entries, and all felonies involving theft or stealing.10
Consistent with this observation, income tax evasion," armed
robbery, 2 automobile theft, 3 and grand larceny 4 have all been
adjudged to have the necessary relationship to credibility.
Admissibility has been refused for prior convictions of rape, 5
morals offenses," and misdemeanors.' 7 The only questionable
decision is Martin v. Commonwealth, the case used to introduce this discussion. In Martinthe Court of Appeals ruled that
a prior burglary conviction could be used to impeach the credibility of a witness, a ruling that is questionable only in the
sense that burglary is a crime that does not necessarily involve
"dishonesty or false statement." However, with most burgla, Cotton v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Ky. 1970).
" Bogie v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1971).
, Thomas v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1972).
, Blair v. Commonwealth, 458 S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1970).
" Iles v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 170 (Ky. 1972).
Harris v. Commonwealth, 469 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1971).
" Dixon v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1972).
'7 Terry v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1971).
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ries committed for the purpose of theft, even this ruling is
generally consistent with the thrust of Cotton.
Subsequent application by the Court of Appeals of the
second part of the Cotton decision is more difficult to appraise.
In only two cases has the discretionary power of trial judges to
exclude relevant convictions been the subject of direct consid5 a case that ineration. The first was Iles v. Commonwealth,"
volved a charge of operating a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner. After his testimony on direct examination,
the defendant was cross-examined concerning his participation
in several prior offenses of automobile theft. On the basis of
several defects in this cross-examination," the Court of Appeals declared that the impeachment of the defendant was
contrary to the "letter and spirit of the rule of Cotton.""5 The
Court reached this conclusion partly because the crossexamination included references to criminal acts that were
similar to the one charged. Special concern was expressed in
the opinion about the use of such evidence, though in this
instance it seemed to be a concern attributable primarily to the
number of prior offenses brought to the jury's attention." The
decision in Iles resulted in a reversal of the defendant's conviction. Despite this fact, and despite the expression of concern
described above, the Court of Appeals did not seem to be as
sensitive as it had been in the Cotton case to the danger of
prejudice to an accused from this type of evidence.
The apparent change in the Court's attitude, which can
only be sensed in the les opinion, surfaced in concrete form in
a second case that involved consideration of the "discretionary
power" aspect of Cotton. In Blair v. Commonwealth2 the defendant was charged with automobile theft. After testifying in
his own defense, he was impeached by use of a prior felony
476 S.W.2d 170 (Ky. 1972).
, The Court of Appeals mentioned several defects in the cross-examination.

II

Among them were: (1) A failure to confine the questioning to felony offenses; (2) a
failure to inquire about convictions and, in place thereof, to inquire about
imprisonment; and (3) initiation of the cross-examination without an in-chambers
hearing, as required by the Cotton case.
" Iles v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Ky. 1972).
21 The Court expressed a fear that the evidence brought to the jury's attention
served to brand the defendant "as a chronic car thief, rather than to impeach his
credibility." Id.
" 458 S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1970).
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conviction for theft of an automobile. Following his conviction,
the defendant appealed, arguing that the identity of the two
crimes-that charged in the case being heard and that underneath his prior conviction-should have compelled an exclusion of the evidence under the principles of Cotton. The Court
rejected his argument and ruled that the action of the trial
court in admitting the evidence was not an abuse of discretion.?
C.

Conclusion
The decision in Cotton v. Commonwealth was as progressive as any impeachment case decided in this country in recent
years. Some of its potential benefit, however, will not be realized unless and until there is generated a greater awareness
than presently exists of the danger involved in the use of information about an accused's prior criminal behavior. It is elementary, of course, that such evidence is admissible only on
the theory that a jury can use it in the assessment of credibility
without otherwise using it in the determination of guilt or innocence. The mental gymnastics demanded of jurors by this
theory is so obviously difficult that the problem should be constantly borne in mind by those who consider the admissiblity
of such evidence. In fact, if scientific evaluations of interpersonal perception may be relied upon for guidance, the task
demanded of jurors in the use of this evidence is probably
beyond their psychological powers. The following statements
are extracted from the most authoritative works on the mental
processes utilized in forming impressions about other people:
There is an attempt to form an impression of the entire
person. The subject can see the person only as a unit; he
cannot form an impression of one-half or of one-quarter of the
person. This is the case even when the factual basis is meager; the impression then strives to become complete, reaching
out toward other compatible qualities.24
* **
:***
23 It should be noted that the real import of this decision is clouded somewhat as
a consequence of the way in which evidence about the accused's prior misconduct was
first introduced into the case. The prior conviction was revealed initially, but without
a designation of its type, in response to a question put to the defendant during direct
examination, i.e., from his own counsel.
24 Asch, FormingImpressions of Personality,41 J. ABNORM. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 258,
284 (1946).
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But it should be stressed that the observer always tends
to see the subject as a unitary whole, however fragmentary
the cues. He is not a sum of his physical, dynamic and other
qualities any more than a chair is perceived as an addition
of certain dimensions and colours. At first sight. . . he is an
individual, and the information about more detailed qualities
which is obtained from subsequent cues is integrated into this
whole.2
The implication of these scientific statements is that jurors will
use information about an accused's prior criminal behavior,
along with all other data, to structure a single, integrated impression of him; such a use of this evidence is clearly inconsistent with the theory under which the evidence is admitted.
In this same body of scientific data there are some other
evaluative observations that have unmistakable importance to
this area of evidence law. They contain a warning concerning
the enormous influence which information of deviant behavior
has on judgments made about the person to whom that information relates. Statements such as the following are commonplace in the literature on interpersonal perception:
A man is under suspicion of murder. During the
investigation certain definite abnormalities of his sexual behavior come to light, even though there is no evidence that
they are related in any way to the committed murder. Again,
the frequent reaction in many people, if verbalized, would
read something like this: "This man whose sexual life deviates so strangely from the norm can also be expected to
deviate from other social norms in any other respect."
Sometimes the perception of a single behavioral consequence may be decisive for the way in which important traits
in a person's character manifest themselves to us, especially
when the relevant product deviates from what we perceive as
the typical product. . . .If a man has committed a crime,
many will perceive his personality in terms of this one behavioral consequence. To many people, a murderer is a murderer
and nothing else. They see in him only the abstract characP. VERNON, PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT: A CRmcAL SURVEY 32-33 (1964).
P5
21 Ichheiser,

28 (1949).

Misunderstandingsin Human Relations, 55 AmER. J. SOCIOL. 26, 27-
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teristic of being a murderer; and this single characteristic
swallows up all the rest of his human nature . ...
A clearer signal of the danger that accompanies evidence
of a defendant's prior misconduct than is contained in these
observations cannot be provided. A more certain need to restrict the use of such evidence to situations in which absolute
necessity for it is shown cannot better be demonstrated. Although the Court of Appeals has done well with this area of the
law, it has not yet accentuated this need for selective use of
such evidence. When it does, decisions like Martin v.
Commonwealth, where five prior felony convictions were admitted to impeach a criminal defendant, will be highly unusual.
II.

VEHIcULAR ACCIDENTS AND EXPERT OPINION

Two people are riding on a piece of farm equipment that
is being pulled along a highway by a farm tractor. An automobile approaches from the rear and collides with the equipment
and tractor. Four people are killed, including the two drivers
and one of the passengers on the equipment. A state trooper
and a coroner investigate the scene of the accident and find the
following circumstances: (1) the tractor was torn into two parts
by the collision and knocked 275 feet from the point of impact;
(2) the farm equipment was rendered unidentifiable; (3) one
body is found 210 feet from the place of collision; and (4) the
automobile traveled 394 feet from tne point of impact. The
trooper and coroner are experienced and trained accident investigators. At a trial involving claims arising from the accident, the two investigators propose to testify that the automobile was traveling at approximately 100 miles per hour at the
time of collision. Should the testimony be admitted? This issue
is one that has been the subject of frequent litigation before the
Kentucky Court of Appeals.
The attitude of the Court toward the issue, at one time at
least, was dominated by a belief that this type of evidence had
limited probative value:
It has been said that violent impacts of moving bodies
F. FRoM, PERCEPTION

OF OTHER PEOPLE

46 (1971).
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sometimes have freakish effects. . . . It is virtually impossible to reconstruct, even roughly, the dynamics of an
automobile accident. . . . This court has yet to see the case
where it can be done post factum from the positions of the
vehicles. There are simply too many unknown and unknowable factors.2
On another occasion, in response to an attempt by a litigant
to get the Court to adopt a more favorable posture toward such
evidence, the Court declared: "[I]f there should be a change
in policy regarding opinion evidence it might be wiser to
restrict than to enlarge its scope. Certainly we are not as yet
prepared to let traffic experts thus invade the province of the
jury."29 Yet, in the case from which the above facts were taken,
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vanover, the
Court ruled that the opinions relating to speed were properly
admitted by the trial court. 3 1 The apparent difference between
the Court's previously declared attitude toward such evidence
and its ruling in this case suggests this as an area that might
be the subject of fruitful evaluation.
A.

A Brief Review of Recent Decisions

A description of "recent" decisions involving this kind of
evidence could begin at nearly any point in time. For purposes
of this discussion, the decision in Hoover Motor Express Co. v.
Edwards' Executrix31 is selected as the point of departure. A
wrongful death action from an automobile-truck collision on an
icy highway was the subject of litigation in this case. To support a claim of negligence, the plaintiff, using two truck drivers
as "expert witnesses," was allowed to introduce evidence of a
reasonable rate of speed for a truck under the conditions prevailing at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals ruled
that this evidence was improperly admitted because the opinions expressed by the witnesses constituted "an unwarranted
invasion of the province of the jury. 3 2 Two reasons explain the
selection of this case as the beginning point for discussion:

'
"

Steely v. Hancock, 340 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Ky. 1960).
Hargadon v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 375 S.W.2d 834, 839 (Ky. 1964).
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanover, 506 S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1974).
277 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1955).
Id. at 478.
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First, the rationale for the decision-invasion of the jury's function-has been a major factor in the development of this area
of law; and second, the decision is part of a group of early cases
(decided during the ten years between 1955 and 1965) in which
the Court of Appeals exercised exceptional caution in authorizing the use of this kind of evidence.
A typical example of the cases in this group is Redding v.

Independent Contracting Co. 33 At the trial of this case, state

troopers who had investigated the accident were allowed to
estimate the speed of one of the vehicles at the time of impact.
Their opinions were based on observations at the scene, particularly the condition of the vehicles. As in Hoover, the Court
of Appeals found the testimony to be improper and the evi'34
dence derived from it "clearly incompetent and valueless.

It

5 involving

reached the same conclusion in a subsequent case
a
dispute over testimony of a police officer who had investigated
a vehicular collision on a narrow bridge. In his testimony this
witness proposed to express an opinion as to the speed of one
of the vehicles at the time of impact, as well as an opinion with
respect to which vehicle arrived first on the bridge. The Court
ruled both opinions inadmissible, the first because of inadequate qualifications of the witness, and the second because "it
was solely the jury's prerogative to resolve this question." 36 The
reason used to justify exclusion of this second opinion was also
the basis for a decision of similar effect in Hargadonv. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 31 a case that involved a wrongful

death claim arising from a train-truck collision at a railroad
crossing. A state police officer, who was qualified as an expert
on traffic safety, offered to testify that the crossing in question
was "very hazardous" and "more dangerous than normal."
Such testimony, said the Court of Appeals in ruling it inadmissible, would "invade the province of the jury." '
In only one case decided during this ten year period did the
Court of Appeals rule in favor of admissibility of the kind of
13 333 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. 1960).
u Id. at 271.
Eldridge v. Pike, 396 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1965).
Id. at 317.
375 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. 1964).
11Id. at 839.
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evidence under discussion. That case, Sellers v. Cayce Mill
Supply Co.,39 involved litigation over an accident between two
vehicles moving along a highway in opposite directions. The
evidence in question was opinion testimony as to the point of
impact, presented by a state trooper who had investigated the
accident scene. A claim was made by the opponent of this
evidence that such testimony would usurp the function of the
jury, the claim successfully asserted in the cases described
above. The response of the Court of Appeals, in rejecting the
opponent's assertion, was simply that the testimony was not
conclusive on the issue of negligence, and, therefore, was properly admitted by the trial court.
Notwithstanding this last decision, the attitude of the
Court of Appeals during this period was broadly negative toward the use of expert testimony about vehicular accidents.
The cases that have been decided in the last ten years, however, reflect an attitude toward such information that is decidedly more favorable. One of the first decisions to reflect this
change of attitude was Moore v. Wheeler." The expert witness
here was a state trooper who had investigated an accident
shortly after its occurrence. After testifying that he had investigated hundreds of such accidents and had received special
training for that part of his duties, he was permitted to express
an opinion as to the speed of one of the vehicles. His opinion
was based on two observations: skid marks found at the scene
and the condition of the car. The Court of Appeals distinguished its earlier decisions by citing to the special qualifications of this witness, and ruled that the use of this evidence was
proper. In a second case" involving the same type of opinion
testimony, the Court again ruled in favor of admissibility and
on this occasion provided some guidance for lower courts:
We believe that expert testimony as to the speed of an
automobile from the length of skid marks, the force of impact, the type of vehicle, conditions of the road and all surrounding factors is competent. In order for one to qualify as
an expert it must be shown that he has had some special
training and experience in this field.4"
' 349 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1961).
40

425 S.W.2d 541 (Ky. 1968).

"

Ryan v. Payne, 446 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1969).
Id. at 277.

4
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The positive attitude reflected in this decision manifested itself
43
again about a year later in the case of Mulberry v. Howard.
Rejecting an argument that testimony of this type infringed on
the jury's role, the Court of Appeals ruled that a trained police
officer, after an investigation of an accident scene, could express an opinion as to the point on a highway where the collision occurred. On the basis of these three decisions, it is possible to conclude that a more liberal approach toward the use of
expert testimony about vehicular accidents has evolved.
B. A Suggestion for Future Consideration
A balanced approach is necessary in dealing with the admissibility of expert testimony concerning vehicular accidents.
Without such evidence, the jury will frequently be left to its
own speculation about the speed of a vehicle, the point of impact of a collision, or some other critical matter. Expert testimony on such issues will often assist the jury in its effort to
reconstruct the accident. At the same time, however, it is important to recognize the ability and willingness of litigants to
produce expert testimony that is itself based on pure speculation, that has no real probative worth, and, more significantly,
that might not be recognizable as worthless by jurors. The
recent decisions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, including
the one used to introduce this discussion, 4 reflect the kind of
balanced approach needed to respond properly to issues involving this type of expert testimony.
Nevertheless, two things could be done to further improve
this area of evidence law. Because of the liberalization in attitude toward this evidence that has evolved during the last two
decades, it is difficult to put the Court's opinions together and
extract a clear-cut standard by which to measure the admissibility of expert accident testimony. Lower courts and litigants,
therefore, are left in large measure to find the most recent prior
decision with "facts" like those of the case in litigation. An
articulation by the Court of a general standard for use in resolving evidentiary issues of this type would add considerable clarity to the law.
457 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1970).
"Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanover, 506 S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1974).
"
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Many years ago Wigmore suggested a standard for this
purpose; no one has since proposed a better one. He said that
the only true criterion of admissibility in this situation is the
following:
On this subject can a jury from this person receive appreciable help? In other words, the test is a relative one, depending
on the 'particular subject and the particular witness with reference to that subject, and is not fixed or limited to any class
of persons acting professionally .... 11
Two thoughts underlie the guideline which Wigmore suggested: First, the circumstances under which this evidence
issue can present itself are truly endless in variation; and second, the question of admissibility of such opinion evidence can
best be resolved by use of a test that is tied closely to the reason
for the "opinion rule." Recognizing that the only legitimate
basis for excluding opinion evidence is that it is unhelpful to
the jury and, therefore, a waste of time,46 Wigmore thought the
issue of admissibility should be simply whether or not the jury
47
could receive assistance from the testimony of the witness.
His thought about this matter is likely to have increasing influence in this area of the law, since his guideline was recently
adopted in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 8 It is a standard,
therefore, that is worthy of consideration by the Court of Appeals.
The second way in which the Court could improve this
part of the law involves the idea that certain kinds of opinion
7 J. WIGMOR, EvIDENcE § 1923, at 21 (3d ed. 1940).
Id. at § 1918.
" Another noted evidence scholar agreed with Wigmore in this regard, as indicated by the following statement:
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than
the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified
to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue
without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the
subject involved in the dispute.
Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. Rav. 414, 418 (1952).
11Rule 702 of these Rules is entitled "Testimony by Experts" and provides as
follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. Evm. 702 (Pub. L. No. 93-595, Jan. 2, 1975).
"
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evidence, if admitted, can "invade the province of the jury."
This idea has been used in several areas of evidence law and,
until recently, has been well embedded. It is frequently employed by Kentucky courts. Again, it would be worthwhile for
the Court of Appeals to consider an evaluation by Wigmore.
With respect to this idea as a basis for excluding opinion evidence, he declared:
[T]he phrase is so misleading, as well as so unsound, that
it should be entirely repudiated. It is a mere bit of empty
rhetoric. There is no such reason for the ["opinion"] rule,
because the witness, in expressing his opinion, is not attempting to 'usurp' the jury's function; nor could if he desired
...
[Hi]e could not usurp it if he would, because the jury
may still reject his opinion and accept some other view, and
no legal power, not even the judge's order, can compel them
to accept the witness' opinion against their own. 9
On occasion the Court of Appeals has made the same point
presented here by Wigmore. For example, in responding to a
"usurpation" claim in Sellers v. Cayce Mill Supply Co.,5" the
Court remarked that expert testimony about the point of impact of a collision would not conclusively fix negligence and
that the jury would ultimately assume responsibility for deciding the issue. However, the Court has not, as suggested by
Wigmore, entirely repudiated the claim. On the contrary, it has
frequently cited "invasion of the province of the jury" as the
reason for a decision.
Elimination of the concept "invasion of the province of the
jury" as a basis for responding to issues about expert testimony
would not substantially affect the admissibility of opinion evidence. It would simply compel a more direct, and hopefully
more appropriate, consideration of the admissibility question.
The most recent case in which the Court of Appeals applied
this idea to justify its decision can be utilized to demonstrate
the impact of this suggested change. Claycomb v. Howard5 '
involved litigation over a rear end collision between two vehicles traveling in the same direction. A police officer, who had
' J. WioMOmm, supra note 45,

349 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1961).
493 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. 1973).

at § 1920.
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investigated the accident scene, was permitted, over objection,
to testify that the speed of the plaintiff's car at the time of the
collision was "unsafe" and "unreasonable" under the conditions that prevailed. Such evidence, said the Court, "invades
the province of the jury"52 and is inadmissible.
Without this concept, how could the issue of admissibility
of such opinion evidence be resolved? The standard suggested
above for determining the admissibility of any opinion evidence is fully adequate to resolve this issue. On this subject can
a jury receive appreciablehelp from this witness? The decision
under this approach would be identical to the Claycomb decision. In those situations where expert testimony is directed
toward an answer to a legal issue, the jury is as capable of
making the determination as any expert witness. Thus, such
testimony would be of no assistance to the jury and would
always be excluded. 3 An adoption of this approach by the
Court of Appeals would eliminate what Wigmore has characterized as "empty rhetoric" and, at the same time, would remove a factor that has caused the resolution of opinion evidence issues to be more difficult than they should be.
I.

BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

A statute that was enacted during the most recent legislative session is as important to the law of evidence in Kentucky
as any case decided during the past year. 4 It is a part of the
state's new Penal Code and contains the following relevant
provisions:
(1) The Commonwealth has the burden of proving
every element of the case beyond a reasonable doubt, except
as provided in subsection (3). This provision, however, does
not require disproof of any element that is entitled a "defense," as that term is used in this Code, unless the evidence
52 Id. at 717.

Several of the cases described above would be resolved in the same way. The
Hoover case (testimony by an expert with respect to a "safe" speed) and the Hargadon
case (testimony by an expert that a crossing was a "dangerous" one, "more dangerous
than normal") are examples. There is one other case, not described above, that would
have the same result. It is Service Lines, Inc. v. Mitchell, 419 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1967),
a case that involved testimony by an officer that a collision would not have occurred
bad a disabled vehicle been off the highway.
- Ky. REv. STAT. § 500.070 (1974) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
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tending to support the defense is of such probative force that
in the absence of countervailing evidence the defendant
would be entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
(3) The defendant has the burden of proving an element of a case only if the statute which contains that element
provides that the defendant may prove such element in exculpation of his conduct. 5
Unless applied with caution, with understanding of its legislative history and in relationship to the law it replaces, this statute will be troublesome for courts. In the discussion that follows an attempt is made to provide some of the data essential
to such an application.
A.

The State's Burden of Proof

One of the most fundamental features of the criminal
process is that which imposes on the state the burden of
proof. The statute under discussion, in its beginning sentence,
does no less: "The Commonwealth has the burden of proving
every element of the case beyond a reasonable doubt . ...
By means of this provision, assuming "burden of proof" to be
used in a conventional sense, the legislature has allocated to
the state two distinct responsibilities related to the process of
persuasion." One of the two, commonly labeled "the duty of
going forward with evidence," is an obligation of proof owed to
the trial court judge. The other, known as the "risk of nonpersuasion," is an obligation of proof owed to the jury. Difficulty has been experienced in this jurisdiction only with the
first of these responsibilities, and almost always that difficulty
has involved the well-known concept called "sufficiency of the
evidence." 7 Consideration of this part of the new statute (i.e.,
that which imposes the burden of proof on the state for "every
element of the case"), therefore, can be confined to one inquiry.
What standard of measurement must be used in deciding if the
state's responsibility to go forward with the evidence has been
satisfied? To state this differently, as it attempts to prove the
w Id.
5,Galloway Motor Co. v. Huffman's Adm'r, 137 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Ky. 1940).
51See Lawson, The Law of Presumptions:A Look at Confusion, Kentucky Style,
57 Ky. L.J. 7 (1968).
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elements of a crime, what must the prosecution do to avoid a
directed verdict of acquittal?
The division of responsibility between judge and jury in
criminal trials allocates to the jury the duty of resolving issues
of fact. In structuring the criminal process, however, the law
has imposed on the judge a restricted obligation to consider
factual issues. He is compelled to keep the jury within the
"bounds of reasonable action,""8 as it undertakes the principal
fact-finding mission. The conceptual tool provided for this task
is that part -of the burden of proof concept described as the
"duty to go forward with evidence." Through the years the
courts of this state have had considerable difficulty in the use
of this tool, with most of that difficulty revolving around the
problem of formulating a standard by which to make the necessary judgements about evidence. 9 Recently, however, the
Court of Appeals adopted a test for this purpose that cannot
be improved:
Running throughout the decisions, and the slightly varying language in which the rule has been stated, the element
of reasonablenessis constant. Ifthe totality of the evidence
is such that the judge can conclude that reasonable minds
might fairly find guilt beyond reasonable doubt, then the
evidence is sufficient, albeit circumstantial. If the evidence
cannot meet that test, it is insufficient."
The circumstances under which judgments about the
sufficiency of evidence must be made are literally infinite in
variation. Consequently, there is no better way to confront
"sufficiency" issues in criminal cases than to inquire if "reasonable minds might fairly find guilt beyond reasonable
doubt." As indicated by the above quotation, the Court of Appeals has recently recognized this fact. And, there being no
indication that the Legislature intended to affect this feature
of previous doctrine, the Court is virtually certain to construe
the new statute accordingly. If Kentucky Revised Statutes §
500.070 [hereinafter cited as KRS] is given this application,
no change in the burden of proof imposed upon the state will
9 J. WIOMORE, EvmrNcE § 2487 (3d ed. 1940).
, See Lawson, supra note 57, at 8-10.
" Hodges v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 811, 813-14 (Ky. 1971).
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have been accomplished by the new Penal Code. With respect
to every element of a crime, the state will have to satisfy an
initial responsibility to go forward with evidence and, if a jury
case is made, will have to assume the risk of non-persuasion.
B.

The Defendant's Burden of Proof

Except in the context of the principles which prevailed
before enactment of KRS § 500.070, it is possible neither to
understand nor to describe the burden of proof imposed by this
statute on a criminal defendant. As a fundamental part of legal
doctrine, the law has long recognized that an accused can be
required to bear the burden of proof on certain elements of a
case. It has also recognized that this sovereign power to affect
in a critical way the ability of a person to defend himself
against criminal charges should be exercised grudgingly. Thus,
under the "old" law, burdens of proof were imposed on an
accused only where allocation of such responsibility was adjudged essential to a fair administration of justice. Even then,
the law was extremely careful to impose on the defendant no
more of an obligation than was absolutely essential to the ends
of justice. It was in the exercise of this caution that the "old"
law found it necessary to categorize defensive elements of criminal cases into two general groups. Solely for purposes of description, the two are labeled below as "defenses" and "affirmative defenses.""1
The burden of proof previously imposed on a defendant
with respect to elements termed "affirmative defenses" was not
unique; the accused was required to bear the burden of going
forward with evidence and, after a jury case was made, to bear
61 The labels used here to describe the two types of defensive elements that exist
in the criminal law are new to Kentucky jurisprudence. That the legal doctrine beneath
the labels is not new, however, is made clear in the document from which they are
drawn:
This section is not intended to change existing law. Presently there are
elements of a case upon which a defendant has merely the burden of going
forward with evidence, i.e., a duty to introduce such elements as issues in
the case. . . .Similarly, there are elements of a case upon which the defendant has the burden of proof, i.e., a duty to persuade the jury that the
elements exist.
KENTUCKY LEGIsLATIvE RESEARCH COMMISSION, KENTUCKY PENAL CODE § 135, Commentary (Final Draft 1971).
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the risk of non-persuasion. However, very few elements in the
criminal law were accorded this treatment. Insanity was probably the most notable such element. Reliance on this defense,
before adoption of the new Penal Code, required that the accused raise the issue through introduction of evidence
and, in
2
the end, that he persuade the jury of his insanity.
Reliance on a defensive element of the other type did not
involve obligations of proof as burdensome for an accused as
those that attached to "affirmative defenses." With respect to
"defenses," the dual responsibility of the burden of proof concept was divided between the two litigants. The burden of
going forward with evidence was allocated to the defendant,
but the ultimate responsibility-the risk of nonpersuasion-was imposed on the state. Self-defense is an example of an element that was given this treatment.13 This approach to proof responsibility, not peculiar to Kentucky law,
has widely prevailed in this country for many years. What is
the rationale for this approach? Why force an accused to initiate proof on an issue such as self-defense and then require the
prosecution to persuade the jury on the issue?
The factors underneath a given choice to allocate the burden of proof on an issue to one litigant rather than the other
are numerous and difficult to describe.64 Those that are most
important in criminal litigation are: (1) fairness to the accused,
meaning by this that because the state seeks to inflict punishment, it should be required to establish the justification for
such punishment; (2) relative access of the litigants to relevant
evidence; and (3) administrative needs of the judicial process.
When these factors are applied to an element such as selfdefense, it is difficult at first glance to see any reason for classifying it as a defensive element. When measured in terms of the
first two factors-"fairness" and "relative access to
evidence"-self-defense seems indistinguishable from those
elements of a crime, such as act, causation, and intent, which
the prosecution is routinely required to prove. Stated differ,2 See, e.g., Henderson v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1974); Terry v.
Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963); Tunget v. Commonwealth, 198 S.W.2d
785 (Ky. 1947).
o See, e.g., Carnes v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W. 723 (Ky. 1912).
91See James, Burdens of Proof,47 VA. L. REv. 51, 58 (1961).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63

ently, since criminal sanctions are imposed on a person who
kills without justification,there seems to be as much reason to
require the state to prove an absence of justification as there
is to require it to prove the act of killing.
On the other hand, when administrative needs of the judicial process are considered, there surfaces a reason to require
that the accused initiate the controversy over such an issue as
this, i.e., to inject the element of self-defense into a case. Without this requirement, in every homicide and assault case the
prosecution would have to prove absence of self-defense (and
all other defenses of justification) to avoid a directed verdict of
acquittal. In other kinds of cases, it would have to do the same
with respect to intoxication, entrapment, duress, insanity, and
so forth. Thus, every factor that could serve to excuse an otherwise criminal act would have to be negated by the state to
prevent a premature termination of the litigation; such an exercise would obviously involve an enormous waste of time and
energy. It was solely to avoid this waste that the' law created
the concept labeled here as a "defense." And because the problem toward which it was directed could be solved by simply
requiring an accused to inject "defensive elements" into a case,
it was necessary to impose on him only the burden of going
forward with evidence on such elements. Upon satisfaction of
that obligation, the prosecution's burden of proof on such defensive elements was not unlike its responsibility with respect
to the elements of a crime. Enough evidence had to be introduced to make a jury case and, once that was accomplished,
the risk of non-persuasion had to be assumed.
The context in which the Penal Code was considered and
enacted included this pre-existing law on burden of proof. How
did the General Assembly intend to affect the then existing law
with the enactment of KRS § 500.070? In answering this question it is necessary to begin with a consideration of the proposal
from which the statute originated. The following provision was
contained in the state's first penal code bill: 5
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), the Commonwealth has the burden of proving every element of the case
beyond a reasonable doubt. This provision, however, does not
H.B. 197, Ky. Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1972).
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require disproof of any element that is entitled a "defense,"
as that term is used in this code, until the defendant has
made such an element an issue in the case by introducing
evidence to support it.
(2) When a defense declared by this code to be an "affirmative defense" is raised at trial, the defendant has the
burden of establishing such defense."
The purpose of this proposal is obvious and unmistakable. Had
the statute been enacted in this form, the prior law would have
been adopted in its entirety and without change. Two kinds of
defensive elements would have been recognized, each imposing
a different burden of proof on an accused. With an understanding of the problems perceived in this proposal by those who
considered the Penal Code at various stages of its development,
the relationship between the new statute and the "old" law
should be discernible. Only two such problems existed. 7
One of the problems can be described as technical in nature, since it involved a concern over use of the words "affirmative defense" in the criminal law. Solution of this problem
required only a slight change in the language of the original
bill. The objectionable words ("affirmative defense") were
eliminated in favor of those now contained in KRS § 500.070(3)
("in exculpation of his conduct"). With this alteration there
was no intention to change the substance of the original proposal. Therefore, it is certain that the Penal Code contains
defensive elements on which an accused must satisfy both responsibilities of the burden of proof concept. 8 He will have to
initiate controversy on such elements through the introduction
of evidence and, after a jury case is made he will have to assume the risk of non-persuasion.
The other problem perceived in the original proposal was
viewed by the drafters of the Code to be of substantial importance. It involved a fear that the proposal's first subsection
" Id. at § 8.

Most of the information about these problems cannot be documented. The
writer was involved with the development of the Penal Code over a five year period
and worked with the Legislative Research Commission in the 1974 legislative session,
during which the Code was enacted. His access to the information described here
resulted from that involvement.
" Two such elements are "insanity" (KRS § 504.020(3)), and "mistake as to
capacity to consent" in statutory rape situations (KRS § 510.030).
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would cause severe difficulty for courts in every instance in
which evidence is offered by a defendant to support what is
labeled here a "defense." The specific concern was over "sufficiency" issues, i.e., how a court should confront a motion for
directed verdict based on evidence offered by a defendant in
support of some defensive element, such as self-defense. It
seems clear that the original proposal was not intended to deal
with this matter at all. Such "sufficiency" issues were to be
resolved under pre-Code principles or under principles developed through the judicial process. In other words, there would
have been no legislative guidelines for determination of such
issues.
The change made in the first subsection of the original
proposal was designed to remedy this perceived shortcoming by
providing a statutory basis upon which courts could respond to
claims for directed verdicts based on evidence supporting a
defensive element. As finally enacted, this part of the statute
provides that the prosecution does not have to assume the burden of proof on such elements unless the defendant's proof, if
uncontested, would entitle him to a directed verdict of acquittal. Without question, this provision is susceptible to several
widely divergent interpretations. However, if construed in light
of its historical development, the following conclusions seem
most appropriate. First, with respect to elements in the Penal
Code that carry the label "defenses,". the General Assembly
intended, with its modification of the original proposal, not to
affect the risk of non-persuasion. After a jury issue is made on
such an element (with self-defense being perhaps the best example), jury instructions will be designed so as to impose upon
the state the risk of non-persuasion on that element. Second,
the enactment manifests no intention to change the standard
of measurement previously used to determine whether or not a
directed verdict based on a defensive element should be
granted. Before the Code, the Court of Appeals had ruled that
the responsibility of a trial court, in dealing with such claims
was not unlike its responsibility in responding to requests for
directed verdicts based on alleged failures of the state to prove
affirmative elements of a crime (such as act, intent, causation,
etc.). On the basis of the evidence before the court, could a
reasonable jury believe to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt

1975]

KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY

699

that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged? This is the
test previously used." It cannot be improved, for it recognizes
that the trial judge's role is simply to keep the jury within the
bounds of reasonable action as it performs the major factfinding function. An interpretation of KRS § 500.070 that is
consistent with these conclusions should serve to further what
this writer believes to have been the not-so-obvious intention
of the legislature-namely, to leave the prior law of burden of
proof largely undisturbed. Such an interpretation should also
serve to avoid difficulty with this part of the law.
", See, e.g., Gailey v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1974); Wheeler v.
Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 254 (Ky. 1971).

